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The  U.S. farm sector  is highly dependent  on sales to foreign  mar-
kets to fully  utilize its  productive  capacity.  In the early  1970s, the
U.S.  farm sector  had 293 million acres in production,  with substan-
tial acres idled. That year 71 million acres,  or 24  percent,  were used
for the production  of exports. Foreign  economic activity  and the for-
eign demand  for U.S. food and feedstuffs then began its phenomenal
growth.  By 1980,  352 million acres were in production, an increase of
nearly  60  million  acres,  but  an  additional  65  million  acres  were
needed to meet foreign (export) demand. In other words, the expand-
ing  export  market  was  responsible  for  most  of the  additional  re-
sources that were  drawn into U.S. agriculture  in the 1970s, and,  in
fact, bid some resources away  from production  for domestic use. The
United  States exhibited a strong comparative  advantage  in agricul-
ture and our farm sector had become "internationalized."
U.S.  agriculture  is going  through  a period  of major adjustment-
foreign import demand is down, land prices are falling, farm  income
has declined and farmers are continuing to leave the sector. From the
peak of 1981,  the  volume  of U.S.  agricultural  exports  has declined
more than one third and the value by nearly 40 percent. Agricultural
exports in 1986 will be similar to the volume and values of the early
to mid 1970s. Another trade landmark was reached in May when the
United  States ran an agricultural  trade deficit for the first time in
fifteen years.  While first perceived  as a one-month  aberration,  U.S.
agricultural  trade has continued  to run deficit for three consecutive
months.
The  declines  in  export  volume,  value  and  market  share  and the
agricultural  trade  deficit  for  the  third  quarter  (fiscal  1986)  have
prompted many to argue that U.S. agriculture  is no longer competi-
tive in world markets-that  the United States has lost its compara-
tive advantage.
The  intention  of this paper  is  to  provide  some  notion  as to  the
similarities  and  distinctions  between  comparative  advantage  and
21competitiveness;  a discussion  of measurements  of the two concepts;
an assessment of the factors most important in determining competi-
tive and comparative  advantage; and finally, a practical lesson we as
public policy economists might heed.
Competitiveness  and Comparative Advantage-A  Definition
Before  we can  answer  the questions  concerning  the  status of our
competitive  position or our comparative  advantage,  it is first neces-
sary  to  understand  the  distinction and  similarities  of comparative
advantage  and  competitiveness.  The  distinctions  between  competi-
tiveness and comparative  advantage  may seem trivial on the surface
but the two concepts are fundamentally  different.  A country can  ex-
perience a loss in competitiveness  while maintaining its comparative
advantage.  Further,  a country can be competitive  without having  a
comparative  advantage.  However,  despite  fundamental  conceptual
differences,  competitiveness  and  comparative  advantage  are  inex-
tricably  linked in the real world conduct  of international trade.
The principle of comparative advantage is at the heart of trade the-
ory. It is an economic theory soundly based on the concepts of oppor-
tunity costs and relative efficiencies with respect to resource use. The
concept  of comparative  advantage,  as put forward by Ricardo,  deals
with  whether  an  economic  unit  (person,  region  or  nation)  has  an
advantage  in producing  a particular  good  compared  to  the  other
goods that can be  produced and compared to the trading opportuni-
ties that may be available.  Tb illustrate this notion  of comparative  or
relative  efficiencies  I  borrowed  an example  from  Paarlberg,  et  al.
Consider the simple case of job specialization  for two people perform-
ing two tasks-gardening  and surgery.  Assume that the first person
is a  doctor and an award winning  gardener.  The  second person  is a
mediocre gardener and has no medical training. In this example, the
first person has an absolute advantage  in both tasks since that per-
son is a better  doctor and a better  gardener.
It may be useful here to also emphasize that Ricardo's major contri-
bution to trade theory was that comparative advantage  and not abso-
lute advantage  was the basis for trade. Absolute advantage  is simply
the concept  of being the low cost  producer.  Debate on U.S.  competi-
tiveness  and  comparative  advantage  in  world  markets  is  often
phrased in terms of whether the United States has lost its position as
low  cost  producer.  While  absolute  advantage  can be  an  important
component  of trade  pattern  determination,  being the  low-cost  pro-
ducer, by itself, is not the necessary nor sufficient condition for deter-
mination  of  the  pattern  of  trade.  I'll  come  back  to  the  cost  of
production issue later in the paper.
The contribution  of the theory  of comparative  advantage  is that it
shows that there is a benefit for each person to specialize in one task
and then trade their services, despite the fact that the first person is
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is relatively  more  efficient  at being a  doctor  than a  gardener.  The
opportunity  cost (social welfare foregone) of the first person utilizing
his  or her time as a  gardener rather  than a doctor  would be quite
high. Consequently, the first person specializes in being a doctor.  The
second person,  despite  a  deficiency  (absolute  disadvantage)  in both
tasks, is relatively more efficient at gardening and specializes in that
task.  Since  the doctor  needs  a  gardener and  the gardener  needs a
doctor they  trade  services  to the  benefit  of both  individuals.  Such
examples  of comparative  advantage  and job  specialization  abound
and are the basis for much of the economic activity of modern society.
People  tend  to  specialize  in jobs  in  which  they  have  a relative  or
comparative  advantage and hire the services of other people.
This example  can be expanded  to  regions  within a  country  such
that, given a set of factor (resource) endowments,  a region may prove
to have  a comparative  advantage  (lower opportunity costs or higher
comparative  factor productivity) in the production  of a certain  good
relative  to  other  goods.  The  region  then  specializes  in  producing
those  goods  in  which it has  a  comparative  advantage  and  trading
with other regions for goods in which it has a comparative  disadvan-
tage.
Extending this notion to the national level, comparative  advantage
is a statement about international  specialization and the trade pat-
terns which would arise in an undistorted world based on differences
in relative  efficiencies  (opportunity  costs) between  countries  in the
absence  of trade. Two  points are relevant  here. First, the concept  of
comparative  advantage  refers to the  comparative  cost  situation be-
fore any trade has occurred.  Having determined  relative or compara-
tive resource costs to produce a mix of goods, a country, when open to
trade,  will produce  and  export those  goods  which it produces  rela-
tively efficiently  and import those goods in which it has a compara-
tive  disadvantage.  Secondly,  and  perhaps  most  importantly,
comparative  advantage  must always be defined using prices that are
not  distorted  by  government  policies and  thus reflect  "true"  social
opportunity  costs.  Comparative  advantage,  then,  is  a  statement
about  what  trade patterns  "ought  to be"  in  an undistorted  world.
Unfortunately,  the  world  is  not  free  of  distortions.  Governments'
policies-both domestic and trade-tend to alter relative prices. Mar-
kets  do  not  always  operate  efficiently  and there  are  rigidities that
inhibit adjustments to world  market conditions.
The  concept  of competitiveness is still  evolving  and there is little
professional consensus on a precise definition. Competitiveness  is dif-
ficult  to define  because  it is a  less theoretically  pure  concept than
comparative  advantage.
Webster  defines  competition  as,  "the effort  of two or more  parties
acting independently to secure the business of a third party by offer-
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statement about  differences  in  market  prices.  While relative  prices
among competitors determine the level  of exports and market share,
it is what makes goods cheaper in one country versus another that is
at the crux of the competitiveness  issue.
The  types  of products  produced  and the patterns  of exchange  on
world markets are determined  by the joint effects  of policies (market
distortions)  and  economic  efficiency-economic  efficiency  being
strongly related to the endowment of factors  such as land, labor and
capital, the basis for comparative advantage.
In  the  short-term,  relative  prices  and  competitiveness  are  influ-
enced  by  policies,  exchange  rates,  and  stochastic  events  such  as
weather and production levels. Factors which determine comparative
advantage  or economic efficiency-technology,  infrastructure,  and ba-
sic resource  endowments-are  relatively  fixed.
Short-run movements  in a country's  competitiveness  is highly  de-
pendent on the dynamic factors related to policy changes. In a sense,
competitiveness  is a policy strategy chosen by a country to achieve a
particular  goal.  Policies  become  the  crucial  determinant  of  the
"terms  offered"  to  a  third  party  in  competing  for markets  in  the
short term. For example, an export subsidy can turn a country, which
according  to comparative  advantage  should  be  an importer,  into an
exporter.  On  the  other  hand,  domestic  policies  can  affect  the
domestic/world  price  relationship  thereby  reducing  exports  of rela-
tively  efficient  countries.  Thus,  concepts  of comparative  advantage
and  competitiveness  differ  because  of  the  distortions  in  markets
brought about by government policies. While comparative advantage
is a statement about what trade patterns "ought to be," competitive-
ness  is a statement  about what trade patterns  "are."
A different set of effects come into play over the longer run. Domes-
tic policies  (distortions) can lead to shifts in input/output  price rela-
tionships. Also, production and marketing techniques  can be altered
by  investment  in  the  sector,  such  as  land-clearing  and  irrigation.
Relative  economic efficiencies  and the comparative  advantage of the
country  can be altered.  Competitiveness  becomes a function  of trade
policies plus the development  strategies  (policies) that influence the
dynamics  of comparative advantage.
Over the  longer  term,  the distortions  introduced  by  a  particular
nation  influence  the rate of technological  adoption,  investment  and
rates of growth in productivity and productive  capacity. A statement
by Krueger  is particularly  relevant  here:  "Trade  policy  affects the
course  of economic development  far more profoundly than our naive
interpretation  of the  theory  of comparative  advantage  would  sug-
gest."  Thus,  while  the  theoretical  concepts  of competitiveness  and
comparative  advantage  are not linked because of distortions,  it is in
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as well as the ability to measure their dynamic effects on production
and trade, that links competitiveness  and comparative advantage  in
the dynamic  "real world" of international  trade.
In  summary,  comparative advantage is an  economically  pure  con-
cept that must assume the world is free of distortions. That economi-
cally pure concept relates factor endowments and factor prices to the
output mix  and trade patterns of a particular  country  on a basis of
opportunity  costs and relative efficiencies.  Competitiveness, however,
is  the  "real  world"  or  the  relaxation  of the  assumption  that  "the
world is free of distortion"  which is associated with comparative  ad-
vantage.  Competitiveness  is,  in  a  sense,  a  strategy  initiated  by  a
nation to achieve  some particular goal-a strategy or distortion em-
ployed to offset some natural or pure comparative disadvantage.  Over
time the use of certain  domestic policies or  strategies  may serve  to
alter factor endowments and factor prices and, therefore, the compar-
ative  advantage  of  a particular  country.  Thus,  the  longer run  dy-
namic  aspects  of  comparative  advantage  and  competitiveness  are
highly  similar.
Measuring Competitiveness  and Comparative Advantage
Comparative Advantage
The recent declines in export value, volume and market share  are
sometimes cited as evidence  of a loss of U.S.  agriculture's  compara-
tive  advantage.  While  those  measures  may  serve  as  indicators  of
competitiveness-trade  patterns "as they are"-they provide little in-
sight into comparative  advantage.
A theoretically pure definition of comparative advantage  is readily
provided in any economic text. But, perhaps because it is so theoreti-
cally pure,  comparative  advantage  is difficult to  measure  in a  real
world context.
Relative Cost of Production. One reason  given for the loss in  U.S.
agricultural  comparative  advantage  is that costs  of production  for
agricultural commodities  in the United States are higher than costs
overseas. Chenery indicates that a country has a comparative advan-
tage  in  exporting  a  commodity  if the  value  of all  factors  used-in
their best  alternative  employment-in  producing  the commodity  is
less than the commodity's export price.  The Domestic Resource Cost
(DRC) approach allows measures  of comparative  advantage  (relative
economic efficiency) among economic  activities within a country  and
between different  countries.  International  domestic resource  cost-of-
production  data  comparisons  are  especially  difficult,  however.  For
many  countries,  data are  generally  unavailable,  and what  data do
25exist are frequently too weak  to be used for an analysis of compara-
tive advantage  since  social costs must somehow  be  derived from ac-
counting  costs.  Even  when  the  data  are  available  and  reliable,
tremendous  problems remain  before meaningful  analysis can be  ob-
tained (Pearson and Meyer).
Because  of the difficulty with the DRC approach, analysts quickly
fall  back  to  direct  comparisons  of accounting  costs.  Using  cost-of-
production data to analyze the comparative advantage  of a particular
commodity across countries has several problems.  First, the methods
of calculating  cost data must be comparable.  That is, if real interest
rates and salvage  values are used in one country, any comparison to
other countries should use the same method.
Secondly,  comparisons  of cost data  for an agricultural  commodity
only show absolute advantage,  not comparative advantage.  Consider-
ation  of the  alternative  uses  for  the  resources  in  each  country  is
required for comparative  advantage. Third, there is considerable dif-
ference  between the factors that determine  national production  and
comparative  advantage  and those that determine  output of an indi-
vidual farm. The former include technology and infrastructure  asso-
ciated with research,  education and transportation.  In this respect a
comparison  of cost  of production  and  marketing  is  probably  more
relevant.  Efficiency  of marketing infrastructure is an important com-
ponent  of  comparative  efficiencies  defined  at  the  port  of  export.
Fourth, and perhaps most important,  it is a mistake to talk about  a
single  cost  of production  for  a commodity.  Data  on  costs  show  the
average cost to get a unit of output, not marginal costs. We know how
the  average  ton was  produced but we  do  not know the  cost  compo-
nents  of the  marginal  ton.  It  is the  marginal  ton that  adjusts  to
changing  prices.  Fifth,  exchange-rate  changes  affect  the  interna-
tional cost comparisons.  A falling  dollar improves the U.S.  position
while a rising dollar lowers it, even though actual costs and relative
efficiencies  in each  country are little changed.
Given all the caveats with regard to use of cost  of production  data
as a gauge of comparative advantage/absolute  advantage,  a compari-
son for wheat and corn is provided in Table 1 for the 1980-82  period.
For wheat,  the United States, on average,  ranks as a high-cost  pro-
ducer.  However,  a  major  wheat  producing  area  such  as  the  North
Plains would be able to compete with the low-cost producers-Canada
and France.  Most  revealing about the wheat cost-of-production  data
is that French producers would appear to be capable of competing in
world wheat markets-even at world prices. For corn, Argentina pro-
ves a very steady and consistent  low-cost producer. France, unlike the
case for wheat, is a relatively high-cost producer.
Relative Efficiency. One  way for a nation to lose  agricultural  com-
parative  advantage  is to become less efficient, raising the "true" rel-
ative social cost of producing agricultural goods (Pearson and Meyer).
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Commodity/Country  1980  1981  1982  Average
dollars/bushel
Wheat:
U.S.  Average  1.52  1.61  1.63  1.59
North Plains  1.06  1.54  1.22  1.27
Canada (Saskatchewan)  1.29  1.31  1.24  1.28
Australia  1.47  2.45  2.25  2.06
France (Seine-et-Marne)  1.23  1.29  1.07  1.20
United Kingdom  1.65  NA  1.53  1.59
Corn:
U.S.  Average  1.29  1.20  1.16  1.22
Corn Belt/Lake  1.18  1.12  1.09  1.13
Argentina  (Pegamino)  0.63  0.96  1.01  0.87
France  (Seine-et-Marne)  2.84  2.37  1.65  2.28
Sources:  Pearson and Meyer;  Stanton;  U.S. Department  of Agriculture  1986b.
Examining  changes  in average  product  for  major types  of agricul-
tural inputs provides a better understanding of changes in efficiency.
The data in Table  2 indicate that the United States  about  held its
own with respect to productivity per unit of cropped area in the rest
of the  world  (ROW).  The  average  product  for  land  in the  United
States increased  11  percent  between  1977  and  1984-peaked  at  17
percent  in 1982-compared with  15 percent for the ROW  (world less
United States).  Substantial productivity  gains were  seen  in Europe
and, in more recent years, in India and other Asian countries.
The average product  of U.S.  agricultural labor over the same time
period (Table 3) increased 39 percent compared with 17 percent in the
ROW,  but 44 percent  in  the  other  developed  countries.  While  U.S.
relative efficiency with respect to labor improved vis-a-vis developing
regions, the United Kingdom and France experienced unprecedented
gains in agricultural labor productivity.
Table 2. Indices of Average  Crop Product per Unit of Cropped Area
Country/
Region  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984
(1977  =  100)
United States  100  105  113  100  114  117  100  111
World less U.S.  100  104  105  105  106  109  111  115
Developed less  U.S.  100  104  107  107  107  110  109  115
Africa  100  102  105  107  106  109  104  108
Latin America  100  102  106  109  109  109  109  113
Asia  100  102  100  103  108  108  113  115
United Kingdom  100  103  103  110  107  121  113  139
France  100  108  120  128  121  120  110  128
India  100  103  95  98  106  104  115  117
Sources:  U.S. Department  of Agriculture  1986a and  1986c.
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Country/
Region  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984
(1977  =  100)
United States  100  108  119  112  131  133  120  139
World less U.S.  100  105  105  106  108  111  113  117
Developed  less U.S.  100  108  113  118  122  130  132  144
Africa  100  102  102  103  103  105  98  101
Latin America  100  103  105  110  114  114  111  117
Asia  100  104  102  104  111  111  120  122
United Kingdom  100  107  112  122  126  137  142  163
France  100  108  122  136  138  144  142  163
India  100  106  98  100  108  105  118  120
Sources:  U.S. Department of Agriculture  1986a and 1986c.
Comparative  advantage  at any point in time is determined  by the
production  technique  involved  and prices  for  inputs  and products.
The  data  presented  in Tables  2  and 3  suggest that the technology
component  of  U.S.  agricultural  unit  costs  probably  fell  at  a  faster
rate than  its foreign counterpart  over  the  1977-84 period,  with the
exception  of certain European countries.
Table 4.  Indices of Average  Product for Labor, Agricultural and Nonagricultural
Year  Agricultural  Nonagricultural
(1977  =  100)
1973  81  93
1974  79  91
1975  89  93
1976  94  97
1977  100  100
1978  108  102
1979  119  101
1980  112  101
1981  131  104
1982  133  106
1983  120  113
1984  139  119
Source:  U.S. Department of Agriculture,  1986a.
Data on the average  products of various inputs in the nonfarm sec-
tor in aggregate  are not readily available, except for labor productiv-
ity. Table 4 compares indices of average  product for labor in the U.S.
farm and nonfarm sectors.  The  use of only  labor productivity limits
the robustness  of any  conclusions,  but the average  product  for U.S.
agricultural  labor rose  39 percent  from  1977  while nonagricultural
labor productivity rose only 19 percent. Agriculture would appear to
maintain an advantage  in relative efficiency  (labor) compared to the
nonagricultural  sector.
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ized countries,  but not for all countries.  Among selected industrial-
ized  countries,  the  United  States  showed  the  least  growth  in
aggregate  labor productivity  between  1970 and  1982 (Table 5).  Pro-
ductivity  growth  in  Japan and Europe  was  well  above  that experi-
enced by the United States, while Canadian productivity growth was
only slightly higher.
Table 5.  National Productivity Indices, Selected  Countries
United  OECD
Year  States  Canada  Japan  Europe
(GDP per employed  person,  1970 =  100)
1970  100  100  100  100
1971  103  105  104  104
1972  106  108  113  107
1973  108  111  120  112
1974  105  111  119  114
1975  105  110  122  114
1976  107  115  128  120
1977  109  115  133  122
1978  110  116  138  125
1979  109  115  143  129
1980  109  113  148  130
1981  110  114  153  131
1982  109  112  156  133
1983  111  115  159  135
1984  114  118  167  139
Source:  Organization  for Economic Cooperation and Development.
These productivity observations suggest that the relative efficiency
of U.S.  agriculture  grew  compared to the relative  efficiency  of ROW
agriculture.  The changes in productivity observed in the '70s suggest
declining relative unit costs for agriculture  in the United States com-
pared to those overseas. In the aggregate, these data suggest that the
U.S.  agricultural  comparative  advantage  may be  intact and that we
remain a low cost,  although not the lowest  cost, producer for wheat
and corn.
Competitiveness
While  competitiveness  is difficult  to  define  in terms  of economic
concepts,  it is perhaps  more  easily  measured than comparative  ad-
vantage. There are numerous measures that can be used to get some
feel  for  a  nation's  position  in  a  given  market  such  as total  trade
volume, market shares and relative trade shares. The method I think
most interesting is that developed by a colleague,  Tom Vollrath, with
the Economic  Research  Service.  The  method is an extension  of the
Balassa  method and is simply  a  comparison  of how  well a  country
has  done  in  exporting  some  particular  set of goods,  let's say  food,
29compared  to  how  well  it has  done  in exporting the  total  of all  its
goods. If, for example,  a country has a 15 percent share of the world
food market but only a 10 percent share of the world market for trade
of all goods, then it is assigned a coefficient  of 1.5 as its competitive
advantage in food.
An update of Vollrath's results (Table  6) indicates that in  agricul-
tural goods,  the United States  increased  its competitive  advantage
through  1980. While U.S. competitive  advantage declined from 1980
to 1984  it remains  a relatively  strong advantage.  Developing  coun-
tries' competitive  position,  however,  has been  on the decline.  Other
developed countries, as a group, experienced an improvement in their
competitive position. In manufacturing,  however, the opposite is true;
the United States having gone from a coefficient  of .86 in the 1950s
to .74 during the mid 1980s during which time the developing  coun-
tries went from .35 to  .59 in the manufacturing  area.  The other de-
veloped countries also experienced a decline in competitive  position.
These  coefficients,  looked  at over  time,  provide  some  notion  of the
dynamics of long-run competitiveness.
Table 6.  Revealed  Competitive  Advantage,  1955-84
Export Commodity/
Region  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1984
Coefficients
Food:
United States:  1.04  1.38  1.65  1.09  1.49  1.64  1.50
Developed less U.S.  .68  .55  .61  .73  .60  .88  .84
Developing  2.31  2.48  2.49  1.81  1.20  1.06  1.25
Raw Materials:
United States  .48  .82  .70  .84  1.07  1.36  1.23
Developed  less U.S.  .85  .70  .88  .83  .63  .87  .93
Developing  1.59  1.69  1.49  1.71  1.03  1.00  1.05
Basic Manufacturers:
United States  .86  .78  .73  .65  .71  .74  NC
Developed  less U.S.  1.44  1.37  1.25  1.22  .89  1.29  NC
Developing  .35  .39  .46  .60  .55  .59  NC
NC-not calculated for 1984
Source: Vollrath, Thomas
Factors Influencing  Competitiveness  and Comparative
Advantage
Competitiveness  is a complex issue. Measuring comparative advan-
tage and competitiveness,  ex post, tells us little about what causes a
country to become  more  or less competitive.  To  understand if a na-
tion will become more or less competitive  one has to understand how
the  United  States  and  other  countries  adjust to  changing  market
conditions-how governments intervene in the market to compensate
for some comparative  disadvantage.
30Government  policies are more  important and pervasive than natu-
ral endowments in determining competitiveness and comparative ad-
vantage. The critical component in the short run is the policy factors
which  often completely  outweigh  any  comparative  disadvantage  on
the  basis of relative  economic  efficiencies.  Policy factors are  impor-
tant in the longer term as well.  They become  the source  of the "dy-
namics" of comparative  advantage.
There are a number of policy factors that influence  competitiveness
and  future  comparative  advantage  for  U.S.  agriculture.  The three
most important  policy  areas  are:  domestic  macroeconomic  policies;
domestic farm policies; and foreign trade and agricultural  policies.
U.S.  Macroeconomic  Policies
Fiscal and monetary policies  affect both the short-run competitive
position  of U.S. agriculture  and its long-run comparative  advantage.
The effects of monetary and fiscal policies on the agricultural sector
are  numerous.  Two  major  macroeconomic  linkage  variables  to  the
sector-interest rates and exchange  rates-were  chosen to highlight
the differing effects on competitiveness and comparative  advantage.
Exchange Rates. Movement of the exchange rate can affect the com-
petitive  position  of  U.S.  agriculture  in three  different  dimensions
(Dunmore).  First,  because  agricultural  products  are  generally  de-
nominated and traded in dollars, an appreciation of the dollar causes
prices in an importer's currency to increase and therefore causes im-
port demand  to fall.  There  is a short lag time associated  with this
impact and it basically affects the U.S. competitive  position vis-a-vis
importing countries.
Secondly,  there is a more immediate  substitution  effect dimension
to an exchange  rate change. Again,  because goods are traded in dol-
lars, an appreciation  of the dollar causes prices (returns) to competi-
tors to  increase  in terms of their currencies.  This  "windfall"  gain
allows  competitors  to  underbid  U.S.  dollar  prices  and yet  increase
export revenues in terms  of their national currencies.  These  two di-
mensions  of an exchange  rate change tend to affect  the competitive
position of the United States in the short term by (1) altering relative
market  prices faced  by importers  and  (2) altering relative  market
prices  between  the  United  States  and  competitors.  But,  resources
and technology  are relatively fixed so comparative  advantage on the
basis of existing resource  endowments  has not been altered.
The third dimension of the exchange rate effect is longer term and
more dynamic  in nature. Continued appreciation of the dollar in the
early  1980s,  for  example,  provided  a  stimulus-either  directly  or
through government programs-for  competitors to alter the level and
rate of investment in their agricultural  sectors thus changing future
technology, productivity  and productive capacity.  Once productive ca-
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a  "sunk  cost"  and  capacity  will  not  leave  the  sector at the  same
speed  at which  it was  added.  This third dimension  effect  of an  ex-
change  rate movement  has the potential  to alter long-run  competi-
tiveness  and comparative  advantage  of the  United  States  vis-a-vis
competitors.
Interest Rates. Another macroeconomic  policy influence stems from
movements  in  interest  rates.  While  interest rates  may  not have  a
very direct short-term  impact on the competitive  position of U.S. ag-
riculture  versus  the agricultural  sector  of other countries,  they do
have a longer-term effect on competitiveness  and comparative advan-
tage. The  interest rate  effect  over the longer term is similar to the
third dimension exchange rate effect. Interest rates affect the cost of
capital for replacement or expansion. A sustained change in interest
rates could influence the rate of growth in investment and productive
capacity  leading  to  an  altered  factor  endowment  and comparative
advantage  over the  longer term.
Tax  Policy. Fiscal  policies  such  as  tax  policy  can  influence  the
short-term  competitive  position  of  a  sector-through  the  budget
deficit/exchange  rate linkage.  However,  the tax policy can also influ-
ence agricultural  investment  and alter the mix of resource use.  Tax
policy  has  caused  agriculture  to be  more  capital  intensive  than  it
would otherwise  be.  Recent work  in the Economic  Research  Service
estimated that  up to  20  percent  of net  investment  in agricultural
equipment during the 1960s and 1970s can  be attributed to tax pol-
icy (Hrubovcak and Le Blanc).  Tax induced investment led to expan-
sion of productive capacity and productivity which altered (enhanced)
the U.S.  long-term  comparative  advantage-the  comparative  advan-
tage we apparently still maintain  vis-a-vis other countries.
U.S.  Domestic  (Farm) Policies
Much like macroeconomic  policies, U.S. farm programs-price  sup-
port  and deficiency  payment  programs-have  short-  and longer-run
impacts on competitiveness  and comparative advantage.  In the short
run, inflexible domestic farm programs (loan and target prices) make
it impossible for U.S. prices to adjust to world market conditions and
the United States becomes less competitive.  When prices cannot  ad-
just,  quantities  will.  The  adjustment  in export  quantities  over the
1980s  led  to  a  substantial  deterioration  in  our  market  share  and
competitive position in those commodity markets.
When  stocks  became  excessive  in the early  1980s,  acreage reduc-
tion programs  were implemented  unilaterally  by the United States.
Thus, the United States reduced the risk of downward  movement in
world prices and bore the burden of stock/production  adjustment at
no  cost  to  producers  or  taxpayers  in  other  countries.  These  high
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importing countries to expand productivity and productive  capacity.
Our system of deficiency payments,  while  seen as an income  sup-
plement allowing many producers  to remain on the farm, may have
longer-term implications for competitiveness  and comparative advan-
tage  of U.S.  agriculture.  Substantial  income transfers to producers
via  the  deficiency  payment  and  other  farm  programs-$20  to  $25
billion  in  1986-augers  to  keep  land  values  and  land  rents  artifi-
cially high. That begs the question-to what extent might our longer-
term comparative  advantage  be eroded if the price of a major input
(land) is kept from adjusting to its true economic value?
The Impact of Foreign Trade Policies
The policies  of other countries and their conduct  of trade has also
affected  our competitive  stance in  world  markets.  Competitors  use
pricing  and  export  marketing policies  that  affect their competitive
positions and to offset some comparative disadvantage relative to the
United States.  The  United States,  however,  has  implemented  new
export marketing policies designed to offset  a competitive disadvan-
tage.
Among competitors,  the policies of the European  Community  (EC)
have had a significant impact on U.S. competitiveness  and, perhaps,
comparative  advantage.  High  price  supports  and  export  subsidies
have greatly enhanced the competitive position of the EC, changing
it from an importer to an exporter.
The high price supports provided  strong incentives  for investing in
the agricultural  sector and for adoption of new, yield-enhancing tech-
nologies.  Some  would  argue  that these  policies  have  now provided
France and perhaps the United Kingdom with a comparative advan-
tage in the production and marketing of wheat. While a great deal of
our  handwringing  over  EC policy  centers  on  the  more  immediate
impact of subsidies  on the competitive  position of the United States
in world  markets,  those  same  policies,  over time,  have  altered  the
comparative advantage  of the EC.
There  are  other  examples  of foreign  domestic  and trade  policies
that distort free market conditions and alter both short-term compet-
itiveness  and longer-run  comparative  advantage  in the  production
and  marketing  of  agricultural  products.  Saudi  Arabia-this  year
likely to be the largest Middle  East exporter  of wheat-is a glaring
example.  Government  policies  influence  its  short-run  competitive-
ness (Saudi Arabia is marketing wheat to other North Africa/Middle
East countries at subsidies of up to $400 per ton) and its longer-term
comparative advantage  (substantial government investment in land
reclamation  and irrigation  has improved relative  economic efficien-
cies).
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In closing,  there are a  few general  observations and one practical
lesson that I think are important to take away from this discussion.
First, has the United States lost its comparative  advantage  in agri-
culture? No, but it does not have as strong an advantage  as it had in
the  late  1970s.  Second,  is the  United  States  competitive  in  world
agricultural  markets?  Yes,  but not as competitive  as  it was  in the
early  1980s.  Third, policy  factors are  more important than basic re-
source endowments  in determining  comparative  and competitive  ad-
vantage.
Numerous research  studies have  identified the factors  responsible
for the loss of our competitive  position.  This list of factors  includes:
foreign  production,  global  economic  activity,  third  world debt,  high
value  of the U.S.  dollar, foreign  agricultural  policies and U.S.  farm
policies.  The  many  studies have  contributed  to an increased  under-
standing of the importance of these factors on our short-run competi-
tive  position.  Too  few  studies,  however,  have  considered  the
longer-run  dynamic influences  on comparative  advantage  and long-
term competitiveness.  As public policy educators we need to increase
the  level  of general understanding  of the long-run consequences  of
foreign  and domestic policies  on the allocation  of resources  and the
dynamics  of comparative  advantage.
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